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Comments
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
UNITED STATES COURTS
I. INTRODUCTION
In his recent law review article entitled A Revisionist View of Customay
International Law, Professor Trimble provided a comprehensive survey
and analysis of domestic courts' application of customary international
law.' The article set forth an extensive discussion of three main catego-
ries of cases: human rights, 2 expropriation3 and the extraterritorial ap-
plication of law.4 In examining these cases, Professor Trimble
concluded, inter alia, that customary international law lacks political le-
gitimacy and "should be applied by the judiciary only when its applica-
tion can be satisfactorily justified on the basis of an independent
domestic source of authority."' 5 More specifically, he submitted that
"courts should never apply customary international law except pursuant
to political branch direction."
6
This Comment reexamines a selection of cases from the three cate-
gories listed above and suggests that despite the diversity and change-
fulness of state practice in today's international society, common norms
of conduct emerge from state practice and are binding on all states as
customary international law. Domestic courts are equipped to apply
such customary norms and by so doing will promote the development
and enforcement of customary international law.
A. Background
As an introduction to this Comment, this section defines customary
international law and describes its beginnings and current status as law
in the United States. Constitutional, doctrinal and practical limitations
on the ability of domestic courts to decide international matters are dis-
cussed. Also set forth is the process by which a court ascertains a norm
of customary international law.
1. See Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 665 (1986).
2. Id. at 693-96.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 696-707. Professor Trimble also discussed customary international
law cases involving sovereign and diplomatic immunity and the law of treaties,
but these topics will not be addressed by this Comment. Id. at 688-92.
5. Id. at 672.
6. Id. at 716.
(1089)
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1. Customary International Law
Public international law deals with "the conduct of states and of in-
ternational organizations and with their relations inter se, as well as with
some of their relations with persons, whether natural or juridicial." 7
The most authoritative enumeration of the sources of public interna-
tional law is found in article 38(1) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice:
a) international conventions, whether general or particular,
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting
States;
b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice ac-
cepted as law;
c) . . . general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations;
d) . . .judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations, as a subsidiary means
for the determination of rules of law. 8
This Comment focuses on one source of public international law, inter-
national custom.
Customary law is unwritten law that arises through an inductive
process based on practice among states. Custom may be considered
"the olde[st] and the original source of International Law." 9 As a
source of international law, custom refers to conduct or knowing absten-
tion from conduct, of members of a society which is part of the legal
order of that society. 10 To become a binding rule of international law, a
custom must be a practice that states follow and deem to be a legal obli-
gation.I I With respect to the latter requirement, such an obligation will
not arise out of a practice done through courtesy or where a state be-
lieves that it is legally free to depart from a custom at any time. That is,
7. 1 RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 101 (Tent. Draft No. 6) (1985) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (No. 6)].
8. Statute of the International Court ofJustice, 1977 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. No. 3, at
77.
9. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 25 & n.l (8th ed., H. Lauterpacht,
1955).
10. H. STEINER & D. VACTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 290 (3d ed.
1986); see also A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1971).
11. See H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 10, at 298 & n.29 (citing Hudson,
Working Paper on Article 24 of the Statute of the International Law Commission, [1950]
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 26, U.N. Doc. A/CNA/16). The requirements for custom
to become binding international law have been stated to be: "1) 'concordant
practice' by a number of states relating to a particular situation; 2) continuation
of that practice over 'a considerable period of time;' 3) a conception that the
practice is required by or consistent with international law; and 4) general acqui-
escence in that practice by other states." H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 10,
at 298 & n.29.
1090 [Vol. 32: p. 1089
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the practice must comply with the opiniojuris sive necessitatis-a conviction
that the rule is obligatory. 12 The United States Supreme Court has
ruled that customary international law is "part of our law, and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate ju-
risdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly
presented for their determination." 1
12. H. STEINER & D. VACTS, supra note 10, at 299; see also Case of the S.S.
"Lotus," 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (leading case on opiniojuris). An example
of the customary international law process is given below:
During a period in the early years of the 20th century, the distance
seaward within which a nation could exercise sovereignty or any other
form of sovereign rights was limited to a narrow band seaward from its
coastline. The United States and many other states maintained that the
limit was 3 nautical miles. Some states, particularly Chile, Ecuador and
Peru, sought an expanded territorial sea of 200 nautical miles. They
claimed this zone and sought to exercise rights in the area as territorial
sea. Other states, including the United States, treated that claim as a
violation of international law and a struggle followed. In the end, the
international community agreed that a 200-nautical mile territorial sea
violates international law. A maximum limit of 12 nautical miles is now
established for the territorial sea.
During the same period, the United States sought to expand
coastal state jurisdiction seaward by advocating the legal regime of the
continental shelf. At the time of President Truman's 1945 Continental
Shelf Proclamation, the regime of the continental shelf did not exist.
No regime of automatic special coastal state resource rights in the sea-
bed beyond the territorial sea had been articulated as a rule of custom-
ary international law. Absent, perhaps, historic rights, the law of the
sea limited the coastal state's exclusive resource rights to the narrow
band of territorial sea. The United States initiated a rather rapid devel-
opment of a new rule of law by claiming rights in the resources of the
continental shelf, acting pursuant to the claim, and obtaining the acqui-
escence and support of other interested states. Until there was suffi-
cient state practice and opinio juris to establish the new regime, the
United States was in violation of the relevant customary international
law.
Charney, The Power of the Executive Branch of the United States to Violate Customar-
International Law, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 913, 915 (1986) (footnote omitted).
13. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). For a discussion of The
Paquete Habana, see infra notes 22-31 and accompanying text. In a recent opin-
ion, Judge Bork discussed the intention of the constitutional framers to incor-
porate the law of nations as a part of law in the United States:
It was assumed by the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution that our
obligations under international law would be honored. In the course of
their rebellion, the American colonies were quick to assure the world
that the 'law of nations [would be] strictly observed.' 14J. CONT. CONG.
635 (1779). The Continental Congress, lacking meaningful authority,
had to content itself with passing a resolution urging the states to pro-
vide judicial remedies for infringements of the rights of ambassadors.
21 J. CONT. CONG. 1336-37 (1781). This resolution was apparently in-
effective, for Edmond Randolph was later, at the constitutional conven-
tion, to identify as one of the defects of the Articles of Confederation
that 'they could not cause infractions of treaties or of the law of nations,
to be punished,'. . . . I M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 19, 25 (1911). In arguing for ratification, John
3
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2. Comparison with Treaty Law
Treaty law is the supreme law of the land according to the Constitu-
tion,14 and is a major source of international law. 15 Treaties supersede
all inconsistent state law, both prior and subsequent; therefore, states
must accept and adhere to obligations specified in international agree-
ments. 16 Treaty law also supersedes all prior federal law. 17 The "last-
in-time" rule provides that where a conflict exists between a treaty and a
federal statute, that which was enacted last will prevail. 18
Whether the last-in-time rule governs application of customary in-
ternational law with respect to inconsistent federal statutes is a central
issue in evaluating the application of such law by domestic courts. The
Jay subsequently characterized it as 'of high importance to the peace of
America that she observe the law of nations.' The Federalist No. 3, at
13 (P. Ford ed. 1898). Accord, Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the
National Law of the United States, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 55-56 (1952) ('the
Constitution was framed in firm reliance upon the premise, frequently
articulated, that ... the Law of Nations in all its aspects familiar to men
of learning in the eighteenth century was accepted by the framers, ex-
pressly or implicitly, as a constituent part of the national law of the
United States').
Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1456-57 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
14. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The supremacy clause provides:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of
the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.
Id. (emphasis added).
15. See B. JANKOVIC, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw 273 (1984).
16. H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 10, at 582 ("[I]t is difficult to read
the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution and escape the conclusion that a
treaty supersedes inconsistent state law, whether . . . prior or subsequent
thereto.").
17. See, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888) (federal statute im-
posing duty on sugar imports from Santa Domingo supersedes earlier treaty
calling for duty-free imports). Professors Steiner and Vagts pointed out that this
settled rule providing for the superiority of subsequent federal law over treaties
is contrary to the writings of John Jay in The Federalist No. 64:
They who make laws may, without doubt, amend or repeal them;
and it will not be disputed that they who make treaties may alter or
cancel them; but still let us not forget that treaties are made, not by
only one of the contracting parties, but by both; and consequently, that
as the consent of both was essential to their formation at first, so must it
ever afterwards be to alter or cancel them. The proposed Constitution,
therefore, has not in the least extended the obligation of treaties. They
are just as binding, and just as far beyond the lawful reach of legislative
acts now, as they will be at any future period, or under any form of
government.
THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (.Jay) (quoted in H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 10,
at 587).
18. Murphy, Customay International Law in U.S. Jrisprudence-A Comment on
Draft Restatement 11, 20 INT'l, PRACTIONER'S NOTEBOOK 17, 17 (Oct. 1982).
4
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Restatement of Foreign Relations provided in a 1980 tentative draft that, as
with treaty law, customary international law prevails over an earlier in-
consistent federal statute. 19 This proposition was widely criticized2 °
and, in response, a subsequent 1985 revision was promulgated. The Re-
statement's drafters suggested that the supremacy of custom over earlier
inconsistent federal laws had not been determined "authoritatively," but
that circumstances clearly existed under which custom would prevail. 2 '
Although disagreement as to application of the last-in-time rule to
custom has existed, the seminal case establishing customary interna-
tional law as part of the law of the United States, The Paquete Habana,22
unequivocally indicated that customary international law is only a
proper basis for a United States court decision "where there is no
treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial deci-
sion." 23 The Paquete Habana involved the appeal of a decision condemn-
ing two Spanish fishing vessels and their cargo as a prize of war during
the Spanish American War. 24 A blockade was instituted under United
States law by both presidential proclamations and federal law declaring
war between Spain and the United States. 25 The seized vessels were
unarmed and had made no attempt to run the blockade or to resist cap-
ture.2 6 At trial, the issue arose whether the vessels were properly sub-
ject to capture, because an ancient doctrine had recognized such fishing
vessels as exempt from capture as prize of war.2 7 As it had been con-
tested in the past, the Court reviewed the history of the doctrine to de-
termine its present status as binding customary international law. 28 The
Court held:
19. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 commentj, reporters' note 4 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980).
20. See, e.g., Goldklang, Back on Board The Paquete Habana: Resolving The
Conflict Between Statutes and Customary International Law, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 143
(1984); Murphy, supra note 18, at 17-18.
21. RESTATEMENT (No. 6), supra note 7, § 135 comment d; see also Trimble,
supra note 1, at 678 & n.52. Professor Trimble stated that "it seems clear that
the drafters envision some situations in which a norm of customary international
law would supersede an act of Congress." Id. at 678 n.52.
22. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
23. Id. at 700.
24. Id. at 678. The ships involved were run out of Havana, were owned by a
Spanish subject and sailed under the Spanish flag. Id.
25. Id. At the onset of the Spanish American War, the United States estab-
lished a blockade of the northern coast of Cuba. Id. at 712. In 1898, the vessels
were seized by a blockading squadron and sold at auction in the United States.
Id. at 678-79.
26. Id. at 678.
27. Id. at 686. The Court stated that "[b]y an ancient [custom and] usage
among civilized nations, beginning centuries ago, and gradually ripening into a
rule of international law, coast fishing vessels, pursuing their vocation of catch-
ing and bringing in fresh fish, have been recognized as exempt, with their car-
goes and crews, from capture as prize of war." Id.
28. Id. at 687-708.
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[B]y the general consent of the civilized nations of the world,
and independently of any express treaty or other public act, it is
an established rule of international law, founded on considera-
tions of humanity to a poor and industrious order of men, and
of the mutual convenience of belligerent States, that coast fish-
ing vessels, with their implements and supplies, cargoes and
crews, unarmed, and honestly pursuing the peaceful calling of
catching and bringing in fresh fish, are exempt from capture as
prize of war.2 9
The Court concluded that international law, although established "inde-
pendently of any express treaty or other public act," is part of the law of
the United States, and "[flor this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no
controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to
the customs and usages of civilized nations." °3 0 The Court found the
capture of the vessels unlawful. 3 1 Thus, custom is recognized as the
supreme law of the land.3 2
3. International Matters Before Domestic Courts
Any consideration of domestic courts' application of customary in-
ternational law must be prefaced by a discussion of the constitutional
and doctrinal limitations which preclude domestic courts from deciding
international matters, whether treaty law, customary law or foreign pol-
icy are implicated.
a. Political Question Doctrine
Based on history and the structure of the Constitution, broad for-
eign affairs powers are accorded to the national government.3 3 Under
the political question doctrine, 34 issues which are primarily political in
29. Id. at 708.
30. Id. at 700, 708 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 714.
32. See Schneebaum, The Enforceability of Customary Norms of Public Interna-
tional Law, 8 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 290, 290-91 (1982).
33. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1 th ed. 1985). The doctrine of
separation of powers arises from the structure of the Constitution: legislative
powers are set forth in article I, executive powers in article II and judicial powers
in article III. See U.S. CONST. arts. I-IL. Therein, certain explicit foreign affairs
powers are granted Congress and the Executive. The Constitution grants Con-
gress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations" and "[t]o de-
clare War." Id. art. I, § 8, cls. 3 & 11. The Constitution grants the Executive the
power to be commander in chief and to make treaties with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate. See id. art. II, § 2, cls. I & 2.
34. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.15, at
102 (3d ed. 1986). The political question doctrine states that certain matters
brought before courts are "really political in nature and best resolved by the
body politic rather than suitable torjudicial review." Id. The authors noted that
as "all constitutional interpretations have political consequences," the doctrine
should more properly be known as the doctrine of"nonjusticiability." Id. (quot-
1094 [Vol. 32: p. 1089
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nature are inappropriate for judicial review and are non-justiciable. 3 5
Issues involving foreign affairs often fall squarely within the scope of the
political question doctrine, primarily because such questions "uniquely
demand single-voiced statement of the [g]overnment's views."' 36 An ex-
ample of the political question doctrine as applied to the President's for-
eign affairs power is Goldwater v. Carter.3 7 In this case, a plurality of the
Supreme Court held that the Court could not decide the issue of
whether the President could terminate a treaty without congressional
approval. 38 Justice Rehnquist stated in a concurring opinion that the
question presented was non-justiciable because it involved "the author-
ity of the President in the conduct of our country's foreign relations and
the extent to which the Senate or the Congress is authorized to negate
the action of the President."'3 9 Justice Rehnquist emphasized that the
dispute raised implications of foreign relations which provided "compel-
ling" evidence that the case was within the political question doctrine. 40
b. Foreign Sovereign Immunity
When a foreign sovereign state or a state instrumentality is named
as a party to an action brought in a United States court, the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA) may operate to grant jurisdic-
ing R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 56 (1955)). The
latter name would better emphasize that the issue is one inappropriate for judi-
cial consideration. Id.
35. Id. at 102-10. The Supreme Court summarized the political question
doctrine as follows:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question
is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the is-
sue to a coordinate political department; or a lack ofjudicially discover-
able and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking in-
dependent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coor-
dinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various depart-
ments on one question.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
36. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
37. 444 U.S. 996 (1979). This case involved a claim brought by Congress-
men that President Carter's action in terminating a treaty with Taiwan was un-
constitutional because Congress had not participated in the termination. Id. at
997-98 (Powell, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 997-98, 1002 (Powell, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). This concurring opinion was
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Stevens.
40. Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Specifically, Justice Rehnquist noted
that the validity of a treaty commitment to use military force was at issue. Id. at
1002-03 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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tipnal immunity to the state or its instrumentality. 4 1 The FSIA was en-
acted in 1976 to codify a common-law doctrine under which a state was
immune from jurisdiction in a United States court, except where the
state was acting in a private or a commercial capacity. 4 2 The FSIA spe-
cifically provides that a state is immune from the jurisdiction of courts of
the United States except for a case in which: 1) the state has waived
immunity; 2) the state is acting in a commercial capacity or 3) property
was taken in violation of international law and such property was in the
United States in connection with a commercial activity carried on by the
state.
4 3
c. Act of State Doctrine
The act of state doctrine is a judicial doctrine under which a United
States court must refrain from deciding a case, notwithstanding its
proper exercise ofjurisdiction, because the case calls into question the
act of a foreign sovereign state. 44 A modern statement of the doctrine is
found in the Supreme Court's opinion in Banco National de Cuba v. Sabba-
tino.4 5 The court stated:
[T]he Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of a taking
of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign gov-
ernment, extant and recognized by this country at the time of
suit, in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous agree-
ment regarding controlling legal principles, even if the com-
plaint alleges that the taking violates customary international
law.46
Sabbatino involved a claim by the Castro government for payment owed
to a nationalized Cuban sugar company by a United States importer.4 7
41. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2892
(1976) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1982)).
42. See Note, The Act of State Doctrine and Allied Bank, 31 VILL. L. REV. 291,
292 n.6 (1986).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)-(3) (1982).
44. See Note, supra note 42, at 295-316 (discussing application and policy of
act of state doctrine in United States case law); see also H. STEINER & D. VAGTS,
supra note 10, at 726 (defining act of state doctrine); see generally Bayzler, Abolish-
ing the Act of State Doctrine, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 325 (1985) (recent comprehensive
overview of the act of state doctrine).
45. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
46. Id. at 428.
47. Id. at 405. In Sabbatino, the respondent, an American commodity bro-
ker, contracted with a Cuban corporation largely owned by United States resi-
dents to buy Cuban sugar. Id. at 401. Following the United States government's
reduction of its Cuban sugar quota, the Castro regime expropriated the corpora-
tion's property and rights. Id. at 403-04. To secure permission of the Cuban
government to ship the sugar, the broker undertook a new contract and agreed
to make payment for the sugar to a Cuban instrumentality. Id. at 404-05.
Thereafter, the bills of lading were again transferred to the petitioner, another
Cuban instrumentality. Id. at 405. The bank instructed its New York agent to
1096 [Vol. 32: p. 1089
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The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision which denied
payment on the ground that the nationalization of the company was in
violation of international law.4 8 The Supreme Court, instead, applied
the act of state doctrine, reasoning that application of the doctrine is
required when adjudication of an act of a foreign sovereign state may
impede foreign relations goals sought by the political branch.4 9 The
Court added, however, that the act of state doctrine "does not irrevoca-
bly remove from the judiciary the capacity to review the validity of for-
eign acts of state."'50 Rather, the Court noted that the doctrine is
properly applied when there is little or no codification or consensus re-
garding an issue of international law and where the sovereign's act im-
plicates an important or sensitive issue of foreign policy. 5 1
d. Executive Suggestions
When a domestic case implicates some aspect of foreign policy, the
executive branch has established a practice of intervening in the case to
suggest an outcome. 52 Courts often comply with the executive sugges-
tion in cases with international implications to avoid conflicts with exec-
utive branch foreign policy.5 3 According to some courts 54 and to a
plurality of the Supreme Court,5 5 deference is compulsory whenever the
executive intervenes in an act of state case.5 6
The doctrine of compulsory deference to executive suggestions re-
deliver the bills of lading to the broker, who accepted them, received payment
for the sugar from its customer, but refused to deliver the proceeds to the Cu-
ban instrumentality. Id. at 405-06.
48. Id. at 428.
49. Id. at 423-27.
50. Id. at 423.
51. Id. at 428.
52. See Note, Acts of State and Conflicts of Laws, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 234, 238-40
(1960).
53. See R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER, 86-102 (1964) (discussing judicial deference to executive policy).
54. See Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maat-
Schappij, 210 F.2d 375, 376 (2d Cir. 1954) (per curiam) (where state depart-
ment issued definitive expression of executive policy as to exercise of American
courts' jurisdiction to pass upon validity of acts of Nazi officials, court amended
its previous mandate to comply); see also Note, supra 42, at 313-16 (discussing the
Bernstein cases).
55. See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759
(1972) (plurality opinion). In First National City Bank, the respondent brought an
action to recover excess collateral it had pledged with petitioner to secure a
loan. Id. at 760. The petitioner, an American banking concern, counterclaimed
for that excess as an offset against the value of petitioner's property in Cuba
which the Castro government had expropriated without compensation. Id. at
761. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals holding that the act of
state doctrine barred assertion of the counterclaim. Id. at 762-76.
56. For a discussion of the act of state doctrine, see supra notes 44-51 and
accompanying text.
1987] COMMENT 1097
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garding recognition of an act of state arose in Bernstein v. Van Heyghen
Freres Societe Anonyme. 5 7 This has become known as the "Bernstein ex-
ception" to the ac of state doctrine. The Bernstein case involved a claim
by plaintiff for the value of a shipping vessel which the Nazi's seized
during World War 11.58 The Second Circuit found that the Nazi seizure
was an act of a foreign sovereign state which a domestic court could not
review. 59 However, the court noted that if the executive branch were to
suggest a different result, the court could find the act of state doctrine
inapplicable and could adjudicate the confiscatory acts of the Nazi gov-
ernment. 60 Thus, in a later action which the same plaintiff brought, the
court relied on a letter to the court from the State Department in its
refusal to apply the act of state doctrine. 6 1
e. Treaty Law
In addition to the above limitations upon domestic courts' ability to
decide international matters, the growing body of treaty law operates to
diminish the likelihood that a question of international custom will arise
in a United States court. Since World War II, treaty law has proliferated
in the United States and elsewhere. 62 Treaties cover a variety of both
national and private interests. 63 Additionally, "declaratory" treaties
may supplant norms of customary international law.64 In this way, trea-
57. 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.) (action for conversion of the plaintiff's ship), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947).
58. Id. at 247.
59. Id. at 248-51.
60. Id. at 251. The court stated: "[T]he only relevant consideration is how
far our Executive has indicated any positive intent to relax the doctrine that our
courts shall not entertain actions of the kind at bar; some positive evidence of
such an intent being necessary." Id.
61. See Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stroomvaart-Maat-
Schappij, 173 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1949), modified per curiam, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir.
1954).
62. See H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 10, at 327 (stating United Na-
tions Treaty Series reproducing treaties registered with the U.N. Secretariat ex-
ceeds one thousand volumes and the older League of Nations Series had two
hundred and five volumes).
63. See id. Some treaties may reach national political interests such as trea-
ties establishing peace settlements or weapons limitations, while others may af-
fect private parties indirectly such as agreements on foreign aid. Id. Some
treaties, such as tariff accords, may directly and specifically affect private parties.
Id.
64. Id. at 361. The extent to which a treaty may generate customary law is a
subject of debate with theorists divided roughly into "positivist" and "activist"
camps. Id. For an activist theorist, a succession of bilateral treaties among sev-
eral states may give rise to a customary norm which binds a state not a party to
any of the treaties. Id. An activist would reason that: "[A] solution worked out
by statement of important and interested nations and ratified by their govern-
ments is apt to be the most practical and satisfying one. That solution . . .
should be considered relevant or persuasive for the development of a customary
rule setting standards for all countries." Id.; see North Continental Sea Cases,
10
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ties serve to "codify" customary international law, a situation somewhat
analogous to statutory laws supplanting common law. 6
5
f. Arbitral Tribunals
In many circumstances, the United States has made claims on behalf
of its nationals that perhaps otherwise would be brought before domes-
tic courts. Often, such claims are mandatorily submitted to binding ar-
bitration before international arbitral tribunals. 6 6 This may be done by
treaties which contain "compromissory clauses" requiring parties to a
treaty to submit their disputes to arbitration. 67 Some arbitral tribunals
are established by special agreement. 6 8 A prominent example is the
Iran-United States Claims tribunal, established after the settlement of
the 1979 Iranian hostage crisis.6 9 After the hostages were seized and
confined in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, President Carter issued a decla-
ration blocking the removal of all property and interests of the Govern-
ment of Iran in the United States. 70 In 1981, when the hostages were
released, a settlement was reached whereby both Iran and the United
States agreed to terminate all litigation brought by their nationals. 7' An
arbitral tribunal was established to settle litigation, and Iran agreed to
transfer $1 billion to a British bank for satisfaction of the arbitral
awards. 7 2 The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of arbitral
scheme in Dames & Moore v. Regan. 73 There, the Court found that,
although the President does not have plenary powers to settle claims, he
could exercise such power in certain circumstances. 74
1969 I.C.J. 3, reprinted in, 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 340 (1969). (World Court
provides analysis of whether boundary treaty created customary law binding
nonparty).
Positivists would argue that treaties among party-nations could never give
rise to a norm binding non-parties. The positivist would find that "[tihe treaty
structure among other countries simply constitutes an exception to a body of
customary law which has left [the non-party state's] discretion unimpaired." H.
STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 10, at 361.
65. See H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 10, at 327-28. The analogy be-
tween treaty law and domestic legislation is useful but limited. A treaty is con-
sensual and normally binds only parties, while a statute validly adopted by the
legislature binds all members of the society. Id. at 328. Unlike a treaty, legisla-
tion adopted by majority rule may bind dissenters. Id. at 328.
66. See id. at 228-32.
67. Id. at 229. Such compromissory clauses relate only to disputes arising
from the provisions of the treaty in which they are contained. Id. An example
would be "a compromissory clause in a treaty fixing land boundaries requiring
arbitration only for conflicts over those boundaries." Id.
68. Id. at 171.
69. Id. at 172.
70. Id. (discussing Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981)).
71. Id. (discussing Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981)).
72. Id.
73. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
74. Id. at 688. The Court held:
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4. Ascertaining a Norm of Customary International Law
In an international case, where constitutional and doctrinal limita-
tions are inapplicable, executive branch direction has not been offered
and where the issue involved is not covered by treaty or committed to an
arbitral scheme, a domestic court may be faced with the task of ascer-
taining and applying a norm of customary international law. To ascer-
tain a norm, a court must look to the "raw material" of international
custom-state practice. 75 Any state action or inaction, articulation or
silence may be state "practice" if the state's behavior manifests a recog-
nition of a customary norm. 76 To rise to a level of a customary norm,
the state action must be evident to other states "within a reasonable pe-
riod of time."' 77 The Supreme Court has stated that state practice may
be evidenced by "consulting the works ofjurists, writing professedly on
public law; or by general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial
decisions recognizing and enforcing that law." '78
Widespread state practice is necessary to establish a norm of cus-
tomary law. 79 Although it is not necessary to prove that states unani-
mously adopt a practice, it remains unclear how many states must adopt
a practice to establish a customary norm of law.80 Ascertaining a cus-
We do not decide that the President possesses plenary power to settle
claims, even as against foreign governmental entities.... But where, as
here, the settlement of claims has been determined to be a necessary
incident to the resolution of a major foreign policy dispute between our
country and another, and where, as here, we can conclude that Con-
gress acquiesced in the President's action, we are not prepared to say
that the President lacks the power to settle such claims.
Id.
75. M. -VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES, 4 (1985).
76. Id. For a further discussion of this element known as opinio juris, see
supra at notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
77. M. VILLIGER, supra note 75, at 4.
78. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820). The
instruction of United States v. Smith was reiterated by The Paquete Habana:
[Wihere there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative
act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of
civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and com-
mentators, who by years of labor, research and experience, have made
themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects which they
treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for specula-
tion of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for trust-
worthy evidence of what the law really is.
175 U.S. at 700 (emphasis added); see also M. VILLIGER, supra note 75, at 4 & n.20
(quoting [1950] Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 187, U.N. Doc. 368ff). For further discus-
sion of proving customary norms, see S. ROSENNE, PRACTICE AND METHODS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 55-82 (1984). For an extensive proposal of how a court
may determine the existence of a custom and opiniojuris, see Glennon, Custom in
Separation of Powers Disputes, 64 B.U.L. REV. 109, 128-44 (1984).
79. See Perluss & Hartman, Temporary Refuge: Emergence of a Customary Norm,
26 VA.J. INT'L L. 551, 556 (1986).
80. Id. One source of evidence of the existence of a norm is when a state
1100 [Vol. 32: p. 1089
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tomary norm is made more complex with the existence in the world to-
day of over 150 sovereign states with a multiplicity of state practices and
ideologies."' In particular, since World War II, socialist and Third
World states have "insisted on the need radically to revise old customary
rules, which appeared to them to be the distillation of traditional West-
ern values ..., the quintessence of the outlook they oppose. ' '8
II. UNITED STATES COURTS' APPLICATION OF CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
United States' courts have applied customary international law in a
variety of cases involving law of the sea, diplomatic immunity, sovereign
immunity and treaty interpretation, as well as other matters. 83 This
Comment will next discuss three leading categories of customary inter-
national law cases: international human rights,8 4 expropriations8 5 and
the extraterritorial application of law. 8
6
A. Human Rights
1. Introduction
The western view of international human rights is generally cast in
terms of minimum standards limiting government conduct with respect
actively protests the breach of a norm. Id. On the other hand, tacit approval can
be evidence:
One means of evaluating the assent of states to the obligatory nature of
a practice is to measure the degree to which non-acting states exhibited
tacit approval of the positive acts of other states. Even more probative
is consistent conformity with the norm against a background of public
articulation of the norm's obligatory character by other states or inter-
national bodies.
Id. at 556-57 (footnotes omitted). Tacit assent may also be inferred where a
state's internal laws are consistent with the norm. Id. at 557.
81. See Oliver, Problems of Cognition and Interpretation in Applying Norms of Cus-
tomary International Law of Human Rights in United States Courts, 4 HOUSTON J. INT'L
L. 59, 60 (1981-82) (discussing problem of applying customary international law
"in a world of more than one hundred fifty sovereign states" whose national
laws and votes in the United Nations "do not always coincide").
82. A. CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 180-83 (1986).
83. See generally T. FRANCK & M. GLENNON, FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NA-
TIONAL SECURITY LAW 96-185 (1987) (chapter relating to "The Law of Nations as
Incorporated into United States Law"). The authors provided cases and other
materials to illustrate the application of customary international law in cases in-
volving human rights, the punishment of privacy and terrorism, extraterritorial-
ity, expropriation and sovereign immunity. Id.
84. For a discussion of international human rights cases, see infra notes
100-42 and accompanying text.
85. For a discussion of expropriation cases, see infra notes 152-94 and ac-
companying text.
86. For a discussion of extraterritoriality cases, see infra notes 199-224 and
accompanying text.
1987] 1101
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to individual freedom.8 7 In 1948, the United Nations General Assembly
unanimously adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
88
The Declaration addresses a broad range of rights including freedom
from torture, equal protection and due process.8 9 The Declaration was
initially intended as a non-binding statement of principles, but has
grown in influence so that it may have the status of custom or general
principles. 90
Since World War II, other far-reaching human rights treaties have
become effective, including the Genocide Convention and The Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.9 1 A Human Rights Com-
mittee was established under the latter treaty. 92 This Committee is
comprised of eighteen members, representing " 'different forms of civi-
lization,' " and has three main duties: 93 1) it studies reports submitted
by member states about states' human rights measures; 9 4 2) it receives
complaints from member states regarding human rights violations by
other member states9 5 and 3) at the option of a member state, it may
87. See M. SHAw, INTERNATIONAL LAW 173 (2d ed. 1986). Dr. Shaw states:
"[D]ue process, freedom of expression, assembly and religion, and political par-
ticipation in the process of government," are the fundamental rights recognized
under international law. Id.
The source of these rights under the traditional view of western states is the
individual consent of the governed. Dr. Shaw provides a comparison with the
Soviet notion of human rights:
The approach of the Soviet Union has been to note the importance of
basic rights and freedoms for international peace and security, but to
emphasize the role of the state. Indeed, the source of human rights
principles is seen as the state....
... [T]he focus is not upon the individual (as in western concep-
tions of human rights) but solely upon the state.
Id. at 174; see also H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 10, at 402-79.
88. See M. SHAW, supra note 87, at 179.
89. See id. The broad range of rights addressed include:
liberty and security of the person (article 3), equality before the law
(article 7), effective remedies (article 8), due process (articles 9 and 10),
prohibitions on torture (article 5) and arbitrary interference with pri-
vacy (article 12) ... rights protecting freedom of movement (article 13),
asylum (article 14), expression (article 19), conscience and religion (ar-
ticle 18) and assembly (article 20).
Id.
90. Id. Professors Steiner and Vagts suggest that the Declaration has been
"so frequently invoked in international fora as an authoritative statement of
human rights and its provisions have been drawn upon in the drafting of so
many human rights treaties that the Declaration itself has over time acquired the
force of law." H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 10, at 439.
91. See M. SHAw, supra note 87, at 180-82.
92. See id. at 182 & n.53.
93. See H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 10, at 448.
94. Id. at 448-49 ("[A] party to the Covenant can declare.., that it recog-
nizes the Committee's competence to receive communications from another
party to the effect that the (declaring) party is not fulfilling its obligations under
the Covenant.").
95. Id. at 449.
1102 [Vol. 32: p. 1089
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receive complaints from individuals who claim violations of human
rights by that state.9 6 The Committee is a prominent example of post-
World War II enforcement efforts in the area of international human
rights.
Generally, under principles of international law, a state may not
question the internal affairs of another state.9 7 However, it may not be
appropriate for states to invoke this general rule in the area of human
rights.98 Under the rule requiring the exhaustion of local remedies,
states may generally resort to international measures only where inter-
nal remedies would not be available or would be unreasonably difficult
to attain.9 9
2. Case Law
In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,00 a unanimous Second Circuit held that
"international law confers fundamental rights upon all people vis-a-vis
their own governments."' 0' 1 In this case, the Filartigas, citizens of Para-
guay, brought suit in the District Court for the Eastern District of New
York against America Pena-Irala (Pena), also a citizen of Paraguay, for
wrongfully causing the death of Dr. Filartiga's son, Joelito, in retaliation
for his father's political activities. 10 2 Joelito was allegedly kidnapped
96. Id.
97. See M. SHAW, supra note 87, at 204 ("The basic rule of international law
providing that states have no right to encroach upon the preserve of other
states' internal affairs is a consequence of the equality and sovereignty of states
and is mirrored in . . .the U.N. Charter.").
98. Id. at 204 & n. 174.
99. Id. at 204-05. This is known as the "Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies
Rule." Id. at 204 & n. 175. This rule is grounded on the policy that states should
have an opportunity "to solve their own internal problems in accordance with
their own constitutional procedures before accepted international mechanisms
can be invoked." Id. at 204-05 & n.176.
100. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
101. Id. at 885. In this case, plaintiffs were citizens of Paraguay. Dr. Filar-
tiga was an opponent of the government of President Alfredo Stroessner. Id. at
878. His daughter, Dolly Filartiga, arrived in the United States in 1978 under a
visitor's visa and had since applied for permanent political asylum. Id.
102. Id. Dr. Filartiga commenced a criminal action in Paraguayan courts
against Pena and the police for the murder of his son. Id. As a result of com-
mencing this action, Dr. Filartiga's attorney was arrested and brought to police
headquarters where he was shackled to a wall and threatened with death. Id.
Later the attorney was allegedly disbarred without just cause. Id.
During the course of the Paraguayan proceeding, Hugo Duarte, who lived
with Pena and who was the son of Pena's girlfriend, confessed to the murder. Id.
at 878 & n.1. Duarte claimed that Joelito was having an affair with his wife and
that he committed the murder in the heat of passion when he discovered his wife
with Joelito. Id. at 878. This claim allegedly contradicted the results of three
independent autopsies demonstrating that Joelito's death " 'was the result of
professional methods of torture.' " Id. at 878. Despite his confession, Duarte
was never convicted for the crime. Id. This action was still pending four years
later when the Filartigas' appeal reached the Second Circuit. Id.
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and tortured to death by Pena, who was then Inspector General of Po-
lice in a Paraguayan city.10 3 In 1979, Dolly Filartiga, who had emigrated
to the United States, learned that Pena was in New York. She filed suit
against him on behalf of herself and her father alleging subject matter
jurisdiction based on the Alien Tort Statute, codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350.104
The Filartigas sued Pena in tort for wrongful death by torture. 10 5
The cause of action was based on, inter alia, a violation of "documents
and practices constituting the customary international law of human
rights and the law of nations."' 0 6 The Filartigas submitted the affidavits
of a number of distinguished scholars who stated unanimously that "the
law of nations prohibits absolutely the use of torture as alleged in the
complaint." 107
The district court dismissed the Filartigas' complaints on jurisdic-
tional grounds, although it recognized that "official torture violates an
103. Id. On the day of Joelito's death, the police brought Dolly to Pena's
home and showed her Joelito's severely disfigured body. Id. As she ran from
the house, Pena shouted "[h]ere you have what you have been looking for for so
long and what you deserve. Now shut up." Id.
104. Id. at 879 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982)). The Alien Tort Statute
provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States." Id. The statute is derived from the First Judiciary Act of
1789 under which federal district courts were granted original jurisdiction over
civil actions "where an alien sues for a tort in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States." Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982)).
105. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 879.
106. Id. Other causes of action were based on "wrongful death statutes; the
U.N. Charter; the Universal Declaration on Human Rights; the U.N. Declaration
Against Torture; [and] the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man." Id.
107. Id. at 879 & n.4. The following is a summary of the scholarly opinions:
Richard Falk, the Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law
and Practice at Princeton University, and a former Vice President of the
American Society of International Law, avers that, in his judgment, "it
is now beyond reasonable doubt that torture of a person held in deten-
tion that results in severe harm or death is a violation of the law of
nations." Thomas Franck, professor of international law at New York
University and Director of the New York University Center for Interna-
tional Studies offers his opinion that torture has now been rejected by
virtually all nations, although it was once commonly used to extract
confessions. Richard Lillich, the Howard W. Smith Professor of Law at
the University of Virginia School of Law, concludes, after a lengthy re-
view of the authorities, that officially perpetrated torture is "a violation
of international law (formerly called the law of nations)." Finally,
Myres MacDougal, a former Sterling Professor of Law at the Yale Law
School, and a past President of the American Society of International
Law, states that torture is an offense against the law of nations, and that
"it has long been recognized that such offenses vitally affect relations
between states."
Id. at 879 n.4.
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emerging norm of customary international law."' 0 8 The court reasoned
that dicta in two recent cases compelled the court to construe the juris-
dictional grant under section 1350 narrowly and as excluding "law
which governs a state's treatment of its own citizens."' 10 9
The Second Circuit reversed the jurisdictional decision and re-
manded the case.' 10 The court found that federal courts do have juris-
diction under section 1350 where there exists a violation of a rule or
norm of customary international law.' Section 1350, the court rea-
soned, includes the emerging law of international human rights.'12 The
court held that section 1350, as construed in Filartiga, is not an authori-
zation to create new law, but rather a grant of subject matter jurisdiction
over claims based on rights already recognized under international
law.' 13 The court employed the following sources as evidence of a
norm of customary international law prohibiting torture: 1) treaty law,
including the United Nations Charter;' 14 2) United Nations declara-
tions;' 15 3) the domestic constitutions and laws; 16 4) State Department
reports summarizing United States diplomatic contacts on the subject of
torture' 17 and 5) writings of international scholars.'' 8 Based on this
evidence, the court held that "international law confers fundamental
rights upon all people vis-a-vis their own governments."' 1 9
Four years after the Filartiga opinion, at least one member of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia questioned the Second
Circuit's construction of section 1350 in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Repub-
108. Id. at 880.
109. Id. (citing Dreyfus v. von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 835 (1976); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975)).
110. Id. at 889. Amicus briefs were submitted by the Justice and State De-
partments, as well as by human rights organizations: Amnesty International-
U.S.A.; Lawyer's Committee for International Human Rights; The International
Human Rights Law Group; The Counsel on Hemispheric Affairs and The Wash-
ington Office on Latin America. Id. at 877.
111. Id. at 878.
112. See id. at 884-85.
113. See id.
114. Id. at 883-84.
115. Id. at 881-83.
116. Id. at 884.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 883. For a further discussion of the sources of customary inter-
national law, see supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.
119. 630 F.2d at 884-85. The court added that "while the ultimate scope of
those rights will be a subject for continuing refinement and elaboration, we hold
that the right to be free from torture is now among them." Id. at 885. The court
found that this result would apply wherever "an alleged torturer is found and
served with process by an alien within our borders." Id. at 878 & n.124. The
case was remanded to the District Court for the Eastern District of New York.
See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). The district court
implemented the Second Circuit's holding and entered a default judgment in-
cluding punitive damages against Pena in excess of $10 million. Id. at 867.
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lic. 12 0 This case involved a 1978 terrorist incident in Israel.' 2 l The
plaintiffs were survivors and representatives of persons murdered in the
1978 attack. 122 The plaintiffs based their jurisdiction, in part, on section
1350, alleging multiple tortious acts by five defendants-Libya, the
PLO, the Palestine Information Office, the National Association of Arab
Americans and the Palestine Congress of North America (PCNA).' 23
The district court dismissed the complaint on several jurisdictional
grounds and the appellate court affirmed the dismissal. 124 The appel-
late panel consisted of Senior Judge Robb and Judges Edwards and
Bork. The panel dismissed the complaint in a one page per curiam
opinion but provided three separate concurring opinions.
Judge Bork's concurring opinion stated that the plaintiffs' com-
plaint should be dismissed because adjudication was not appropriate in
light of separation of powers principles. 12 5 Judge Bork found that no
120. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
121. Id. at 775. Thirteen heavily armed members of the PLO left Lebanon
for Israel under instructions to seize and hold Israeli civilians in ransom for the
release of PLO members incarcerated in Israeli jails. Id. at 799. If the plans
went awry, the terrorists had been instructed to execute their hostages. Id.
The terrorists landed by boat, made their way to a highway where they
stopped and seized a civilian bus, a taxi, a car and later, a second civilian bus,
taking the passengers hostage. Id. All of the hostages were gathered on a single
bus and the terrorists began driving to Tel Aviv. Id. Along the way, the ter-
rorists killed some of the hostages and several occupants of passing cars. Id.
Police finally halted the bus by shooting its tires and engines. Id. The terrorists
reacted by killing several more hostages and finally by blowing up the bus with
grenades. Id.
122. Id. at 775.
123. Id. at 775 & n.l.
124. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981),
aff'd, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). Following
is a summary of the district court's disposition:
The district court dismissed on several jurisdictional grounds.
First the court held that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction since the
plaintiff could not demonstrate a private cause of action sufficient to
meet the requirements of either 28 U.S.C. § 1331 or 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
In addition, the court found the allegation against the three Arab-
American groups-the PLO, the NAAA, and the PCNA-too vague and
conclusory to trigger the requirements of section 1350. Alternatively,
the court found that all the claims, which alleged intentional torts, were
barred by the local statute of limitations. In sum, because the plaintiffs
had failed to demonstrate that the law of nations, pertinent treaties, or
section 1350 itself provided a cause of action, jurisdiction would not lie
under the Alien Tort Statute.
Comment, Enforcing the Customary International Law of Human Rights in Federal
Court, 74 CAL. L. REV. 127, 146 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
125. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 799 (Bork, J., concurring). Judge Bork stated
that the case contained allegations of activity that was of a "politically sensitive
nature" and would thus present "in acute form, many of the problems that the
separation of powers principles inherent in the act of state and political question
doctrines caution courts to avoid." Id. at 808 (Bork, J., concurring). Therefore,
Judge Bork concluded that the case was of the type not "appropriate for federal-
18
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treaty provided plaintiffs with a cause of action.' 2 6 A mere violation of
customary international law, according to Judge Bork, could not provide
a cause of action in United States courts. 127 Judge Bork reasoned that
section 1350 grants jurisdiction for torts committed in violation of the
"law of nations" or "treaties of the United States."' 28 Violation of the
law of nations (customary international law), reasoned Judge Bork,
stands in parity with treaties as a basis for a cause of action. 129 If viola-
tion of customary international law would provide a cause of action,
then violation of a treaty would also.' 3 0 Such reasoning would suggest
that "all existing treaties became, and all future treaties will become, in
effect, self-executing when ratified."'' Judge Bork found that such a
result would contravene two hundred years ofjurisprudence.' 3 2 There-
fore, only a rule of international law which itself provides for enforce-
ment by individuals should give rise to a cause of action in United States
courts. 133
Judge Bork also concluded that international law generally ad-
dresses states and not individuals.' 3 4 He thus criticized the Filartiga rea-
court adjudication, at least not without an express grant of a cause of action."
Id. (Bork, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 808-10 (Bork, J., concurring). In their complaint, the plaintiffs
had alleged that the defendants violated thirteen "treaties of the United States."
Id. at 809 (BorkJ., concurring). Upon examination, howeverJudge Bork found
that only five of the treaties were then binding on the United States. Id. at 808-
09 (Bork, J., concurring). The five binding treaties were: 1) The Geneva Con-
vention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War; 2) Con-
vention With Respect to Law and Customs of War on Land; 3) The Charter of
the United Nations; 4) Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prison-
ers of War of 1949 and 5) OAS Convention of 1971 on Terrorism. Id. at 809-10
(Bork, J., concurring). Judge Bork found that the language of these treaties
called for implementing legislation by state parties or imposed obligations on
the parties to fulfill in good faith the purposes of the treaties. Id. at 809 (Bork,
J., concurring). Accordingly, the treaties were not "self-executing" and did not
grant individuals a cause of action to seek damages for violation of their provi-
sions. Id. (Bork, J., concurring). A self-executing treaty is a treaty "that
manifests an intention that it shall become effective as domestic law of the
United States at the time it becomes binding on the United States ... [and so] is
effective as domestic law of the United States. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES § 141 (1965); see also RESTATEMENT
(No. 6), supra note 7, § 131.
127. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 816-19 & n.25 (Bork, J., concurring).
128. Id. at 820 (Bork, J., concurring).
129. Id. (Bork, J., concurring).
130. See id. (Bork, J., concurring).
131. Id. (Bork, J., concurring).
132. Id. (BorkJ., concurring) ("This conclusion stands in flat opposition to
almost two hundred years of our jurisprudence, and it is simply too late to dis-
cover such a revolutionary effect in such a little-noticed statute.").
133. See id. at 816 (Bork, J., concurring).
134. See id. at 816-17 (Bork, J., concurring). Judge Bork relied on Oppen-
heim, a prominent international scholar:
Since the Law of Nations is based on the common consent of individual
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soning "because the court there did not address the question [of]
whether international law created a cause of action that the priyate par-
ties before it could enforce in municipal courts."' 13 5
In contrast, Judge Edwards agreed with the explication of section
1350 set forth in Filartiga.136 However, in light of the factual distinc-
tions between Filartiga and Tel-Oren, he concurred with the dismissal of
the complaint.l37 In Tel-Oren, the actors (the terrorists) were non-state
parties.13 8 While he found it clear that international law forbids torture
by state actors, such as Pena (a Paraguayan police captain), Judge Ed-
wards found insufficient consensus that non-state actors, such as the
PLO, are subject to the same rules. 139
Finally, Judge Robb, in his concurring opinion, agreed with the dis-
missal on the basis of the constitutional political question doctrine. 140
Judge Robb found the case judicially unmanageable, both politically and
practically. 14 1 Therefore, until the subject of human rights is entrusted
to the judiciary by Congress and the President, Judge Robb found that it
was not a justiciable issue for the courts. 14 2
B. Expropriation
1. Introduction
The most recent tentative draft of the Restatement (Revised) of Foreign
Relations provides that a state is responsible under international law for a
wrongful taking of the property of a national of another state. 143 This
States, States are the principal subjects of International Law. This
means that the Law of Nations is primarily a law for the international
conduct of States, and not of their citizens. As a rule, the subjects of
the rights and duties arising from the Law of Nations are States solely
and exclusively.
Id. at 817 (quoting L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 9, at 19) (Bork, J., concurring).
Judge Bork found that even though international law is increasingly concerned
with individual rights, "human rights" are a vague ideal rather than a legal obli-
gation. Id. at 818 (Bork, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 820 (Bork, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 775 (Edwards, J., concurring).
137. Id. (Edwards, J., concurring).
138. Id. at 776 (Edwards, J., concurring).
139. Id. at 791-96 (Edwards, J., concurring).
140. See id. at 823 (Robb, J., concurring). Judge Robb did not reach the
jurisdictional issues discussed by Judges Bork and Edwards.
141. Id. at 823-24, 26 (Robb, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 825-26 (Robb, J., concurring).
143. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 712 (Tent. Draft No. 7) (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (No. 7).].
This section provides:
§ 712. Economic Injury to Nationals of Other States
A state is responsible under international law for injury resulting
from:
(1) a taking by the state of the property of a national of another
state that is (a) not for a public purpose, or (b) discriminatory, or
1108 [Vol. 32: p. 1089
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(c) not accompanied by provision for just compensation; for compensa-
tion to be just under this Subsection, it must, in the absence of excep-
tional circumstances, be in an amount equivalent to the value of the
property taken, be paid at the time of taking, or within a reasonable
time thereafter with interest from the date of taking, and be in a form
economically usable by the foreign national;
(2) a repudiation or breach by the state of a contract with a na-
tional of another state (a) where the repudiation or breach is
(i) discriminatory; or (ii) motivated by non-commercial con-
siderations and compensatory damages are not paid; or
(b) where the foreign national is not given an adequate fo-
rum to determine his claim of breach or is not compensated
for any breach determined to have occurred;
(3) other arbitrary or discriminatory acts or omissions by the
state that impair property or other economic interests of a national of
another state.
Id. § 712; see also Factory at Chozrow (Merits), 1926-29 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) Nos. 7, 9,
17, 19. This complex case made several appearances before the court and is
summarized, based upon the statement of the court in Nos. 9 and 17, in H.
STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 10, at 483-87. In this famous case, in 1915, the
German Reich entered into a contract with Bayerische Strickstoffwerke A.G.
(Bayerische) under which Bayerische would establish and manage for the Reich
a nitrate factory at Chozrow, in (then German) Upper Selesia. H. STEINER & D.
VAGTS, supra note 10, at 483. The German government owned the land. Id. In
1919, another company, Oberschlesische Stickstoffwerke A.G. (Oberschlesische)
bought the factory, but it remained under the management of Bayerische. Id. at
483-84. Stickstoff Treuhand G.m.b.H. (Treuhand) was also formed in 1919
which became the sole shareholder of Oberschlesische and assumed the obliga-
tions of Oberschlesische for payment for the factory. Id. at 484.
Pursuant to the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, Germany ceded various territo-
ries to Poland, but left for subsequent determination the status of certain territo-
ries in Upper Selesia, including the Chozrow nitrate factory. Id. The Treaty of
Versailles provided that countries could take the property of the German gov-
ernment located on ceded German territory. Id.
In 1922, Germany and Poland entered into the Geneva Convention which
was intended to carry out the terms of the Treaty of Versailles and which also
ceded Upper Selesia to Poland. Id. Head III of the Convention gave Poland the
right to expropriate certain property of German nationals located in Upper Sele-
sia. Id. Later, a Polish court, relying on the Treaty of Versailles and certain
Polish domestic law decreed that the Polish treasury was to own the Chozrow
factory. Id. Germany sued in the Polish courts, went before an arbitral tribunal
and finally before the Permanent Court of International Justice (P.C.I.J.). Id.
The P.C.I.J. decreed that Oberschlesische owned the factory and concluded
that "contractual rights of Bayerische to manage the factory had also been ex-
propriated." Id. The Treaty and Convention, when taken together, rendered
Poland's taking of the factory unlawful. Id. at 484-85. The Court stated:
Further, there can be no doubt that the expropriation allowed
under Head III of the Convention is a derogation from the rules gener-
ally applied in regard to the treatment of foreigners and the principle of
respect for vested rights. As this derogation itself is strictly in the na-
ture of an exemption, it is permissible to conclude that no further dero-
gation is allowed....
It follows from these same principles that the only measures prohibited are
those which generally accepted international law does not sanction in respect oJ
foreigners; expropriation for reasons of piblic utility, judicial liquidation and simi-
tar measures are not affected by the Convention.
Id. at 485 (quoting Chozrow Factory 1926-29 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7, at 22) (em-
1987] 1109
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rule reflects the prevailing western view. 14 4 To satisfy minimum stan-
dards of international law, the taking must be for a public purpose and
must be accompanied by just compensation. 14 5 According to this view
of international law, the compensation must be "prompt, adequate and
effective." 146
The western view of the status of international law regarding expro-
priations is opposed by both communist countries and by the develop-
ing countries of the Third World. 147 The Soviets assert that "an alien
enters the territory of another state or acquires property there subject
wholly to local law"' 48 and communist countries generally "believe that
states may expropriate the means of production, distribution and ex-
change without paying compensation."' 4 9 The developing world, rep-
resenting the majority of states, views expropriation as a means that a
state may employ to serve the goal of economic self-determination.15 0
phasis added). This quote is at the essence of what commentators believe was a
recognition of general rule of international law against expropriation without
fair compensation. See id. at 488 ("Commentators and codifiers ... have built a
vast jurisprudential edifice upon the Chozrow Factory Case.... [T]he case con-
tains the statements of the World Court that are most directly related to
expropriation.").
144. See M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION To INTERNATIONAL LAW
91 (5th ed. 1984).
145. See RESTATEMENT (No. 7), supra note 143, § 712(1).
146. M. AKEHURST, supra note 144, at 91-92 (footnote omitted). "Prompt,
adequate, and effective compensation" are terms of art under international law
established in a famous exchange of diplomatic notes between Secretary of State
Hull and the Mexican Ambassador. See H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, supra note 10, at
488-92 (quoting 3 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 655-61 (1942)).
Between 1915 and 1940, the Mexican government expropriated agrarian and oil
properties owned directly or indirectly by United States citizens. Id. at 488. In a
note dated August 28, 1938, Secretary of State Hull made the following classic
statement of international law regarding compensation for expropriation:
The Government of the United States merely adverts to a self-evi-
dent fact when it notes that the applicable precedents and recognized
authorities on international law support its declaration that, under
every rule of law and equity, no government is entitled to expropriate
private property, for whatever purpose, without provision for prompt, ade-
quate, and effective payment therefor. In addition, clauses appearing in the
constitutions of almost all nations today, and in particular in the consti-
tutions of the American republics, embody the principle of just com-
pensation. These, in themselves, are declaratory of the like principle in
the law of nations.
Id. at 491 (quoting Letter from Secretary of State Hull to Mexican government
(Aug. 22, 1938)) (emphasis added).
147. M. AKEHURST, supra note 144, at 92.
148. RESTATEMENT (No. 7), supra note 143, § 712 reporters' notes 1.
149. M. AKEHURST, supra note 144, at 92.
150. Id. Professor Akehurst stated:
The developing countries hold the balance between the Western
countries and the communist countries. Most of them could gain a
large short-term benefit by expropriating foreign-owned property with-
out compensation, but in the long term they would lose by doing so,
1110 [Vol. 32: p. 1089
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Western states, and the United States in particular, have not modi-
fied the traditional view of the international law of compensation. The
United States has concluded a number of treaties involving foreign trade
and investment under which foreign states have agreed to the western
standard of compensation in the event of expropriation.151
2. Case Law
A court asked to determine an expropriation claim must first deter-
mine whether a confiscatory taking has occurred in violation of interna-
tional law. In West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A. ,152 for example, the court
provided an analysis of whether institution of exchange controls by the
Mexican government constituted a taking. In this appeal of consoli-
dated cases, plaintiffs were United States investors in certificates of de-
posit issued by Mexican banks. 153 At the time plaintiffs purchased the
certificates, the issuing banks were privately owned. 154 In 1982, as the
because they would attract no private investments in the future (or, al-
ternatively, they would have to pay a much higher price for private in-
vestments, in order to compensate for political risks). Developing
countries with left-wing regimes tend to support the communist atti-
tude towards the legality of expropriation. Other developing countries
often enter into treaties for the protection of investments ... in order to
attract further foreign investment; but they show an increasing reluc-
tance to accept the Western view of customary international law about
expropriation.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Resolutions which the United Nations General Assembly has passed reflect
the shift of the Third World to the majority position. In 1974, the General As-
sembly passed the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. G.A. res.
3281, 29 U.N. Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3281 (1974), reprinted in
14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 251 (1975) (subsequent citations to this reprinting).
Article 2(c) of the Charter provides that each state has the right:
(c) To nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership offoreign property in
which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting such
measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circum-
stances that the State considers pertinent. In any case where the question of
compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled under the domes-
tic law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless it is freely and
mutually agreed by all States concerned that other peaceful means be
sought on the basis of the sovereign equality of States and in accord-
ance with the principle of free choice of means.
14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS at 254-55 (emphasis added). Although this resolu-
tion provides that "appropriate compensation" shall be paid, it allows the ex-
propriating state to determine what constitutes appropriate compensation
according to its own laws. Compensation is, therefore, generally likely to be low.
See M. AKEHURST, supra note 144, at 93.
151. See RESTATEMENT (No. 7), supra note 143, § 712 reporters' note 1.
152. 807 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1987).
153. Id. at 822. Plaintiffs had purchased both peso and dollar denominated
certificates. Id. Since 1979, plaintiffs had responded to solicitations from Mexi-
can banks urging American investors to purchase Mexican certificates. Id. The
certificates promised high yields. Id.
154. Id.
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price of world oil fell significantly, Mexico faced an enormous depletion
of its foreign currency reserves resulting ultimately in the Mexican gov-
ernment nationalizing its entire private banking system. 15 5 Addition-
ally, the Mexican government enacted a number of controls regarding
foreign currency exchange rates, including a decree that all certificates
of deposit were to be paid in pesos at a rate specified by the Mexican
government. 15 6 As a result of the mandated exchange rate 157 and the
declining value of the peso, upon maturity of their certificates, plaintiffs
received dollars worth substantially less than the face amount of their
certificates. 1
5 8
The District Court for the Northern District of California granted
summary judgment in favor of defendant Mexican banks. 15 9 Plaintiffs
on appeal alleged, inter alia, that the exchange controls amounted to a
taking in violation of international law.16 0 Initially, the court concluded
that it was not precluded by the act of state doctrine from judging the
validity of the exchange control regulations. 161 The court also prefaced
its analysis with a finding that international law was the correct choice of
law; the court stated that in ascertaining the content of international law,
it could look to various sources of law, including United States law. 162
155. Id. at 822-23.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 823. The Mexican central bank mandated an exchange ratio of
70 pesos to the dollar, while the actual prevailing exchange rate was 112 pesos
to the dollar. Id. The resulting loss to investors was approximately one-third of
the principal. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 822.
160. Id. at 823. Plaintiffs also claimed that the Mexican banks had violated
federal securities laws. Id. at 826-29. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that the cer-
tificates were "securities" within the meaning of 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10). The
court reasoned that certificates of deposit are normally not "securities" within
the meaning of the federal securities laws based on the "insolvency protection
test." Id. at 826-27 (citing Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 558 (1982)).
According to this test, where an instrument such as a certificate of deposit is
"'abundantly protected' against the risk that a bank would become insolvent"
through a scheme of regulation, those financial instruments will not be deemed
securities which require the protection of federal securities laws. Id. at 826 (cit-
ing Weaver, 455 U.S. at 559).
The court noted, however, that it would also be required under United
States law to determine whether the Mexican officials in enacting and carrying
out the exchange control laws violated Mexico's regulatory structure so that the
scheme of regulation, as applied, did not meet the insolvency test. Id. at 827.
Based on the act of state doctrine, the court did not undertake this analysis,
reasoning that "[t]he evaluation by one sovereign of foreign officers' compliance
with their own laws would, at least in the absence of the foreign sovereign's
consent, intrude upon the state's coequal status." Id. at 828 (citation omitted).
161. For a discussion of the act of state doctrine, see supra notes 44-51 and
accompanying text.
162. West, 807 F.2d at 831 n.10. The court concluded that "the rights aris-
ing from a certificate of deposit are 'rights to property' capable of being expro-
priated ... under international law." Id. at 830.
1112
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In holding that the Mexican imposition of exchange controls did
not constitute a taking violative of international law, the court relied on
scholarly writings on the subject,' 6 3 United States case law, 16 4 writings
by the Director of the Legal Department of the International Monetary
Fund,16 5 the Restatement of Foreign Relations,'6 6 decisions of the Foreign
Claims Settlement Commission 167 and writings by the Secretary of
State.'68
The above authorities led the court to conclude that customary in-
ternational law provides every state with "the right ...to stabilize its
currency in time of financial stress." 169 A state's right to impose ex-
change controls, the court reasoned, is limited by a rule of international
law requiring that a state imposing exchange controls not discriminate
against foreign investors. 170 Here, however, the court found that Mex-
ico had not discriminated against foreign investors.171 Finally, the court
stated, in dicta, that international law requires that "appropriate" com-
pensation be paid for expropriated property. 172 Having concluded that
no taking occurred, the court did not further discuss the requirements of
compensation under international law. 173
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 174 a case arising
out of the Cuban revolution, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit addressed the norms for compensation under interna-
tional law. 175 In 1960, the Republic of Cuba nationalized four Cuban
branches of Chase Manhattan Bank. 17 6 The plaintiff in this case was
Banco Nacional de Cuba (Banco Nacional), the central bank of Cuba. 177
After the revolution, Cuban law designated Banco Nacional to take over
163. See id. at 831-32 (for example, court relied on "leading expert" F.A.
Mann and his work, The Legal Aspect of Money).
164. See id. at 831-32 & n.ll (court relied on federal and state court
decisions).
165. See id. at 832.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 832-33.
169. Id. at 832 (quoting In the Matter of Karolin Furst, No. CZ-14, Fourteenth
Semiannual Report 116, 117).
170. Id. (citing Christie, What Constitutes a Taking Under International Law?, 38
BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 307, 332 (1964)).
171. Id. at 832.
172. Id. at 832-33 (citations omitted).
173. Id. at 833. For a discussion of the requirements of compensation
under international law, see supra note 146 and accompanying text. For a discus-
sion of the analysis provided by a United States court regarding international
compensation norms, see infra notes 175-94 and accompanying text.
174. 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981).
175. See id. at 877.
176. Id. at 878.
177. Id. at 879.
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the assets and business of the Chase branches.'17  Banco Nacional com-
menced an action in a United States court asserting claims against
Chase. 179
Chase asserted four counterclaims, one of which was based on in-
ternational law. 180 Chase argued that the expropriation of its four Cu-
ban branches was in violation of international law and sought full
recovery from Banco Nacional "as the alter ego of the Cuban govern-
ment." 18 1 At trial, the court found, inter alia, that it was a "foreclosed
issue that the taking of Citibank's Cuban branches by the Government of
Cuba was in violation of international law." 182 On appeal of this issue,
Banco Nacional argued that the act of state doctrine would bar Chase's
counterclaim.18 3 The Second Circuit rejected this argument and af-
firmed the trial court's opinion that the taking was in violation of inter-
national law. ' 8 4
178. Id.
179. Id. First, Banco Nacional sought over $7 million representing the sur-
plus proceeds that Chase held from the sale of collateral securing a loan to a
certain Cuban banking enterprise. Id. Second, Banco Nacional sought to re-
cover over $2.5 million it had on deposit with Chase. Id. Chase had applied
these monies against obligations which allegedly the Cuban government or in-
strumentalities owed it. Id.
180. Id. Chase alleged that Cuba had converted over $18 million of its
property in violation of international law. Id.
181. Id.
182. 505 F. Supp. 412, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). The trial court gave the fol-
lowing reasons for finding that the taking was plainly done in violation of inter-
national law:
(a) Cuba failed to provide compensation for the taking; (b) the
taking was a retaliatory measure against the United States citizens be-
cause of their Government's actions with respect to the Cuban sugar
quota; and (c) the taking discriminated against American nationals in
that Cuba owned, as well as Canadian and French private banks were
not acquired ... until much later.
Id. The court also quoted the following observation by Professor Lillich: "The
Cuban nationalizations 'based upon a totally illusory funding system and paya-
ble in bonds that were never printed' so patently violated international law that
serious analysis was unnecessary." Id. at 430-31 (quoting 2 R. LILLICH, THE
VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 121 n.6 (1973)).
183. Banco Nacional, 658 F.2d at 880. For a discussion of the act of state
doctrine, see supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
184. See Banco Nacional, 658 F.2d at 884-85. The precise holding of the case
constitutes rather narrow grounds for rejecting the application of the act of state
doctrine. The court rejected application of the doctrine based on three factors
which together comprised a "phenomenological rule." Id. at 884. First, the
court emphasized that the Executive Branch had filed a Bernstein letter advising
the court that the act of state doctrine need not be applied. Id. For a discussion
of the Bernstein exception to the act of state doctrine, see supra notes 57-61 and
accompanying text. Second, the court found that "there [was] no showing that
an adjudication of the claim [would] interfere with delicate foreign relations."
Banco Nacional, 658 F.2d at 884. Third, the court found that "the claim against
the foreign sovereign [was] asserted by way of [a] counterclaim and [did] not
exceed the value of the sovereign's claim." Id. Finding these three factors pres-
1114 [Vol. 32: p. 1089
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Next, the court addressed the question of Chase's damages for this
taking.'1 5 The court first noted that it was obligated to apply interna-
tional law to determine the appropriate compensation owing to Chase
for the expropriation of its Cuban branches. 18 6 Notwithstanding the
confusion and lack of consensus among nations regarding norms of
compensation, the court found that under international law only two
norms could apply to the case at bar: Cuba could pay either "appropri-
ate" compensation or "full" compensation.' 8 7 Under either of these
two norms, it was likely that Chase would receive the same amount of
compensation. ' 88
In addition, the court rejected the argument that international law
would allow an expropriating state to pay either no compensation or
partial compensation.18 9 Rejecting Banco Nacional's argument that
partial compensation would be appropriate because, historically, settle-
ment of expropriated claims results in payment of 40-60% of the value
of the claim,' 90 the court noted that such settlements reflect parties'
compromises and not norms of international law.' 9 '
Although the court conceded that the victim of an expropriation
will not be entitled under customary international law to "full" compen-
sation in all circumstances, 1 92 it concluded that a norm of "appropriate"
compensation may amount to "full" compensation in some cases. 19 3
Here, the court determined that payment for the net asset value of the
expropriated branches represented both "appropriate" and "full"
compensation. ' 94
ent, the court held that Chase's counterclaim was not barred by the act of state
doctrine. Id. at 884-85.
185. Banco Nacional, 658 F.2d at 887-88. The court described the "ortho-
dox position" long held by the United States that compensation must be
"prompt, adequate, and effective." Id. at 888 (citing Dawson & Weston, Prompt,
Adequate and Effective: A Universal Standard of Compensation?, 30 FORDHAM L. REV.
727, 733 (1962)). Reviewing the standards espoused by developing South
American and communist countries regarding compensation, as evidenced in
resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, the court found
"at best a confused and confusing picture as to what the consensus may be as to
the responsibilities of an expropriating nation to pay 'appropriate compensa-
tion.'" Id. at 891.
186. Id. at 891.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 891-92.
189. Id. at 892.
190. Id.
191. Id. The court stated: "We are concerned with the parties' rights and
duties, and we do not believe that international law as to compensation is merely
descriptive of their conciliatory actions." Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 892 & n.22.
194. Id. at 892-93. The court rejected Chase's contention that it was enti-
tled to a premium from the Cuban government representing the "going concern
value" of the expropriated branches. Id. at 893-94. The court defined "going
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C. Extraterritoriality
1. Introduction
Under international law, a state may not "prescribe laws with re-
spect to the activities, relations, status, or interests of persons or things
having connections with another state or states when the exercise of
such jurisdiction is unreasonable."' 195 Generally, a state may exercise
jurisdiction to prescribe laws with respect to conduct which takes place
within, or is intended to have an effect within, its territory, or to persons,
interests or things within its territory.19 6 A state also has jurisdiction to
prescribe laws with respect to its nationals, wherever they are located
concern value" as "the proposition that [a] prospective buyer of a business will
be willing to pay a premium over the book value of the assets in the expectation
that the earnings of the business will continue and that the new owner will re-
ceive that stream of earnings." Id. at 893. Because of the detrimental economic
effects of the Cuban revolution, the court regarded the prospects of Chase's Cu-
ban branches for future earnings as "highly speculative." Id. at 893-94. As a
result, the court concluded that future earnings were an inappropriate basis for
an award of damages. Id. at 894.
195. RESTATEMENT (No. 7), supra note 143, § 403. In determining whether
the exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable, § 403(2) outlines the following as
factors to be evaluated where appropriate:
(a) the extent to which the activity (i) takes place within the regu-
lating state, or (ii) has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or
in the regulating state;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic
activity, between the regulating state and the persons principally re-
sponsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and
those whom the law or regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regu-
late such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such reg-
ulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence ofjustified expectations that might be protected
or hurt by the regulation in question;
(e) the importance of the regulation in question to the interna-
tional political, legal or economic system;
(f) the extent to which such regulation is consistent with the tra-
ditions of the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in reg-
ulating the activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by other states.
Id.
196. RESTATEMENT (No. 6), supra note 7, § 402(1). This section provides:
Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with re-
spect to
(1) (a) conduct a substantial part of which takes place within its
territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present
within its territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory which has or is intended to
have substantial effect within its territory ....
1116 [Vol. 32: p. 1089
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and with respect to activity directed against state security. 197 Customary
international law mandates the limitations on a state's prescriptive
jurisdiction. 198
2. Case Law
Two cases involving the extraterritorial reach of United States anti-
trust legislation provide examples of the two leading approaches that
courts take when considering the limits of jurisdiction to prescribe laws
imposed by customary international law.' 9 9 The opinion in Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,200 parallels the rules of international law
set forth above. In that case, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit examined United States antitrust laws as applied to foreign
conduct of mostly foreign nationals. 2 0 1 Plaintiff Timberlane, an Oregon
partnership which engaged in lumber importing, owned two Honduran
corporations which were in the business of purchasing and milling Hon-
197. Id. § 402(2)-(3). These sections provide: "(2) the activities, status, in-
terests or relations of its nationals outside as well as within its territory; or
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals which is di-
rected against the security of the state or a limited class of other state interests."
Id.
198. RESTATEMENT (No. 7), supra note 143, § 403 comment a. This draft of
the Restatement emphasizes that limitations on prescriptive jurisdiction arise out
of obligations of customary international law. In a comment to this section, the
reporters observe that the "reasonableness" limitation has often been said to be
based on "comity." See id. Comity is defined by the Supreme Court in the semi-
nal case Hilton v. Guyot, as "the recognition which one nation allows within its
territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having
due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its
own citizens." 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). In contrast to customary interna-
tional law, comity is not "a matter of absolute obligation." See id.; see also Rem-
ington Rand Corp.-Del. v. Business Sys., Inc., 830 F.2d 1260 (3d Cir. 1987)
(recent analysis of the doctrine of comity in case testing effect of Dutch bank-
ruptcy order on related litigation in United States). While comity is more than
merely a courtesy which a nation may extend, it does not rest on opinio juris sive
necessitatis-the compulsion of law. See Remington Rand, 830 F.2d at 1267. For a
discussion of opiniojuris and customary international law, see supra notes 11-12
and accompanying text.
The reporters of the Restatement indicate that the reasonableness limitation
of prescriptive jurisdiction is "not merely ... a matter of discretion," but instead
is an obligation which arises "regardless of the state of relations between the
state exercising jurisdiction and another state whose interests may be affected."
RESTATEMENT (No. 7), supra note 143, § 403 comment a.
199. It has been observed that "[tihe situations where the issue of extrater-
ritoriality arises cover a broad spectrum." Gustafson, Introduction: Conference on
Extraterritorialit'y for the Businessman and the Practicing Lawyer, 15 LAW & POL'v INT'L
Bus. 1095 (symposium addressing extraterritorial aspects of antitrust laws, an-
tiboycott provisions, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, and various trade laws); see
also Note, Extraterritoriality: Current Policy of the United States, 19 SYRACUSEJ. INT'L
L. & COM. 493 (1986).
200. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
201. See id. at 604-05.
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duran timber.2°12 The primary defendant, the Bank of America, oper-
ated a branch office in Honduras. 203
In response to the antitrust suit that Timberlane brought in the
United States against the Bank, the Bank argued that antitrust laws
could not apply with respect to activities in a foreign country.20 4 At
trial, Timberlane's antitrust suit was dismissed, primarily on the basis of
the act of state doctrine.20 5
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that the Honduran government
was not directly involved with the activity underlying the antitrust claim
and thus, dismissed the act of state defense. 20 6 The court then analyzed
the extraterritorial reach of United States antitrust laws, adopting a "tri-
partite analysis." Under international law, a domestic law may have ex-
202. Id. at 603.
203. Id. Defendant Bank had a significant financial interest in two Hondu-
ran lumber mills. Id. at 604. A third mill, operated by the Lena family, was
indebted to the Bank and was otherwise in financial trouble. Id. at 604-05.
Timberlane alleged that the Bank entered into a conspiracy with the Lena enter-
prise to join with two other Honduran mills to disrupt Timberlane's efforts. Id.
at 604. This conspiracy allegedly resulted in Honduran court proceedings and
embargoes against Timberlane's Honduran subsidiaries and the arrest and im-
prisonment of Timberlane's Honduran manager. Id. at 604-05.
204. Id. at 601.
205. Id. For a discussion of the act of state doctrine, see supra notes 44-51
and accompanying text.
206. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 605-08. The appellate court criticized the trial
court's reliance on Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F.
Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
950 (1972). In Occidental, the plaintiff sued for violation of the antitrust laws
claiming that defendants had conspired in " 'inducing and procuring' assorted
executive acts by foreign states" to disrupt the plaintiff's oil concessions in the
Persian Gulf. See Occidental, 331 F. Supp. at 95, 107. The court found that the
act of state doctrine barred plaintiff's claim because its complaint directly impli-
cated foreign acts of sovereign states. Id. at 111. Specifically, the court found
that under the act of state doctrine, it could not question the acts of certain
Persian Gulf states in claiming ownership of "the oil-rich portion of plaintiffs'
concession." See id. at 100, 107-13.
In Timberlane, the Ninth Circuit distinguished Occidental Petroleum Corp.,
finding:
Unlike the Occidental Petroleum plaintiffs . Timberlane does not seek
to name Honduras or any Honduran officer as a defendant or co-con-
spirator, nor does it challenge Honduran policy or sovereignty in any
fashion that appears on its face to hold any threat to relations between
Honduras and the United States. In fact, there is no indication that the
actions of the Honduran court and authorities reflected a sovereign de-
cision that Timberlane's efforts should be crippled or that trade with
the United States should be restrained.... Moreover, plaintiffs here
apparently complain of additional agreements and actions which are
totally unrelated to the Honduran government. These separate activi-
ties would clearly be unprotected even if procurement of a Honduran
act of state were one part of defendants' overall scheme ....
Under these circumstances, it is clear that the "act of state" doc-
trine does not require dismissal of the Timberlane action.
549 F.2d at 608 (citations omitted).
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traterritorial reach if there is: 1) some effect on American commerce;
2) a "cognizable injury" to the plaintiffs created by the effect and 3) a
showing that United States' interests in extending the reach of the law
outweigh the interests of the other nation in applying its law. 20 7
The court set forth several factors for consideration in balancing
the interests of the foreign state against those of the United States:
1) the "degree" of potential conflict with foreign law; 2) the nationality
or allegiance of the parties; 3) the location of the businesses involved;
4) the ability of the United States to enforce compliance with its laws;
5) the significance of the effects in the United States as compared with
the significance of the effects elsewhere; 6) the intent to produce fore-
seeable harmful effects in the United States and 7) the relative impor-
tance of domestic violations versus violations occurring abroad. 20 8
Applying this analysis, the court found that the activities of which
Timberlane complained produced an effect in the United States injuring
United States commerce. 20 9 Furthermore, because the court found that
at trial there had not been "any comprehensive analysis of the relative
connections and interests of Honduras and the United States," 210 the
court remanded the action. 21 1
In direct contrast to Timberlane, the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia rejected the balancing of interests analysis
in Laker v. Sabena Belgian World Airways. 2 12 In this case, the British firm
Laker offered transatlantic flight fares at a lower rate than airlines be-
longing to the International Air Transport Association (IATA). 21 3
When Laker's competitors in the IATA effected price cuts, Laker was
eventually forced into liquidation. 21 4 Laker filed an antitrust suit in a
United States federal court against domestic and foreign airlines. 21 5
The foreign airlines filed suit in the United Kingdom seeking to enjoin
Laker from proceeding with its United States antitrust action against
them. 2 16 The United Kingdom High Court ofJustice granted an interim
207. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613.
208. Id.; cf. RESTATEMENT (No. 7), supra note 143, § 403(2). For the text of
§ 403(2), see supra note 195.
209. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614-15 & n.31.
210. Id. at 615. The Timberlane court found "that the complained of activi-
ties were intended to, and did, affect... the flow of United States foreign com-
merce." Id.
211. Id.
212. 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
213. Id. at 916-17. Laker then had a rising demand for its flights and
purchased new planes from McDonnell-Douglas, a United States corporation.
Id. Laker's earnings were mainly in British pounds and when the exchange rate
dropped in 1981, Laker met with serious problems in fulfilling its obligations to
pay McDonnell-Douglas in U.S. dollars. Id.
214. Id. at 918.
215. Id. at 915.
216. Id.
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injunction.2 17 The United Kingdom Court of Appeal thereafter granted
a permanent injunction and ordered Laker to dismiss its suit against the
British airlines. 2 18 Laker then filed for injunctive relief in the United
States against certain United States airlines and several additional for-
eign airlines. In a second suit, Laker sought to prevent the additional
foreign defendants from also obtaining a British injunction compelling
Laker to dismiss its United States suit.2 1 9 The district court granted the
preliminary injunction and the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia affirmed.2 2 0
The appellate court found that, while both Britain and the United
States had jurisdiction, there was no reason why the United States could
not exercise its concurrent jurisdiction. 22 ' After considering whether it
should weigh the interests of the United States against the interests of
Great Britain before exercising its concurrent jurisdiction, 222 the court
concluded that "[a]bsent an explicit directive from Congress, this court
has neither the authority nor the institutional resources to weigh the
policy and political factors that must be evaluated when resolving com-
peting claims ofjurisdiction." 22 3 Because the Executive Branch had not
provided guidance to the contrary, the court held that Laker could con-
tinue its antitrust suit for damages in the United States.2 24
III. ANALYSIS
The case law discussed demonstrates the uncertainty with which do-
mestic courts approach questions of customary international law. In Fi-
lartiga, the Second Circuit held that a violation by a state of an
international norm prohibiting torture gives rise to compensable claims
in United States courts when jurisdiction is established under the Alien
Tort Statute.2 2 5 In Tel-Oren, while the court did not refute the existence
of an international norm prohibiting torture by a state actor, the court
produced three theories for dismissing a claim essentially similar to the
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 915-16.
221. See id. at 948-53.
222. See id. at 955.
223. Id. at 955 (footnotes omitted). The court added:
In contrast, diplomatic and executive channels are, by definition,
designed to exchange, negotiate, and reconcile the problems which ac-
company the realization of national interests within the sphere of inter-
national association. These forums should and, we hope, will be
utilized to avoid or resolve conflicts caused by contradictory assertions
of concurrent prescriptive jurisdictions.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
224. Id.
225. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880. For a discussion of the Filartiga case and the
Alien Tort Statute, see supra notes 100-19 and accompanying text.
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claim in Filartiga.226 West 2 27 and Banco Nacional de Cuba 228 establish that
a court confronted with an expropriation claim faces the dual task of
determining whether a taking has occurred in violation of international
law and if so, the compensation required to be paid under international
law. In the latter case, the court could not definitively set forth whether
international law required "full" or "appropriate" compensation. 22 9
Timberlane230 and Laker23 1 demonstrate divergent views of proper
norms for extending the extraterritorial reach of United States laws.
The debate centers on whether, as a matter of customary international
law, courts should engage in interest balancing to determine the limits
of United States jurisdictional authority.2 32
Uncertainty in United States case law may support two related argu-
ments: 1) customary international law lacks legitimacy as establishing
binding rules of conduct and 2) domestic courts are ill-equipped to as-
certain and apply norms of customary international law.
With respect to the former argument, Professor Trimble has stated:
Evolving norms of customary international law do not re-
ceive the scrutiny that a proposed statute or treaty would re-
ceive within the executive branch, within Congress, or among
concerned members of the American public. Denied this pro-
cess, these norms are not supported by the mythology of popu-
lar consent that a law or ratified treaty acquires. Because a
226. 726 F.2d 774. For a discussion of Tel-Oren, see supra notes 120-42 and
accompanying text. Judge Bork found that an individual must demonstrate an
express grant of a private cause of action before one could invoke jurisdiction
under the Alien Torts Statute. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 798-823 (Bork, J., concur-
ring). For a discussion of Judge Bork's opinion, see supra notes 125-35 and ac-
companying text. Judge Edwards held the evidence insufficient to establish a
norm prohibiting terrorism or non-official torture. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 775-98
(Edwards, J., concurring). For a discussion ofJudge Edward's opinion, see supra
notes 136-39 and accompanying text. Judge Robb found the human rights ques-
tion to be a non-justiciable political question. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 823-27
(Robb, J., concurring). For a discussion of Judge Robb's opinion, see supra
notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
227. 807 F.2d 820. For a discussion of West, see supra notes 152-73 and
accompanying text.
228. 658 F.2d 875. For a discussion of Banco National de Cuba, see supra
notes 174-94 and accompanying text.
229. Banco Nacional, 658 F.2d at 892-93.
230. 549 F.2d 597. For a discussion of Timberlane, see supra notes 200-13
and accompanying text.
231. 731 F.2d 909. For a discussion of Laker, see supra notes 212-24 and
accompanying text.
232. See Kadish, Comity and the International Application of the Sherman Act: E11-
couraging Courts to Enter the Political Arena, 41 N.W.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 130, 164-66
(1982) (courts should not employ interest balancing because it requires courts
to make political determinations); see also Maier, Interest Balancing and Extraterrito-
rial Jurisdictions, 31 AMER. J. CoMp. L. 579, 592-96 (1983) (decisionmakers in dip-
lomatic forum better able to balance interest than court).
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customary norm has a much weaker political foundation than a
treaty, it should not be treated as equally authoritative. 23 3
One response to this observation is that customary international law
may be evidenced by statute or treaty.2 34 Thus, in finding a norm
prohibiting torture in Filartiga, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit relied in part upon the existence of numerous trea-
ties proscribing state torture.2 35 Similarly, courts may look to the do-
mestic laws of the United States and other states as evidence of a
norm. 236 Again, Filartiga provides an example; the court relied on a
finding that "torture is prohibited, [either] expressly or implicitly, by the
constitutions of over fifty-five nations, including . . . the United
States." 23 7 The existence of treaties and widespread domestic law re-
garding a subject of customary international law is not prerequisite or
necessarily sufficient evidence of the existence of a binding norm. 23 8
Where such evidence is relevant, however, the customary norm is indi-
rectly subject to the same political process and scrutiny in its formation
233. Trimble, supra note 1, at 730. Customary international law lacks legiti-
macy according to Professor Trimble for several additional reasons. First, cus-
tomary law does not comport with American political tradition that "[t]he
authority of law-making institutions [rests] on the consent of the governed." Id.
at 719. Because a binding law of custom may arise through practice "wholly
outside the United States it has no basis in popular sovereignty at all." Id. at
721. The "law of nations," referred to in the Constitution and incorporated into
the common law, does not provide a historical basis for modern customary inter-
national law. Id. at 723 (citing U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 10). Rather, the law of
nations "referred primarily to the law merchant and maritime law." Id. Finally,
customary international law, unlike constitutional law, cannot be employed to
overturn violative actions by the political branches because it is not regularly
relied upon as a basis for political discourse. Id. at 726.
234. For a further discussion of a treaty or statute as evidence of customary
international law, see supra note 64 and accompanying text. See also Note, The
Application of International Human Rights in United States Courts: Customay Interna-
tional Law Incorporated Into American Domestic Law, 8 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 207,
227-30 (1982) (cataloguing use by domestic courts of treaties in ascertaining
customary norms of human rights).
235. See 630 F.2d at 882-84.
236. For a discussion of evidence of customary international law norms, see
supra note 78 and accompanying text.
237. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884 & note 13 (citing U.S. CONST., amends. VIII,
XIV) (footnotes omitted).
238. See B. JANKOVIC, supra note 15, at 16. The author stated:
Usage is not the same as international custom .... Usage [is an
international practice] used in the intercourse of countries with no
sense of obligation, since the parties do not wish to bind themselves
with a mandatory rule but prefer to consider the relationship temporar-
ily regulated. This means that the application of rules of usage is an
attempt to regulate the interests of two or more parties. Of course,
usage . . .can after long use prove acceptable to the interested sides
and in this way become transformed into international custom, or they
may just as easily be abolished unilaterally.
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as the treaties and domestic laws evidencing it. It is true that the forma-
tion of treaties in the United States rests in part on a domestic political
process, 23 9 while in contrast, customary law is based on consistent prac-
tice by states so that a binding norm could be created wholly based on
the practice of foreign nations.2 40 A state is not bound by a principle,
however, "if it rejected that principle during the process of its develop-
ment."' 24 ' Customary norms do not bind a state that persistently ob-
jects to their existence.2 42
Further, customary norms, which are important to both the United
States and to the international community may be vitiated where a court
fails to apply a customary norm in an appropriate case.2 43 Treaty law
has not been enacted to regulate many critical areas- of international
conduct. 24 4 Rather than viewing itself as ill-equipped to determine and
239. See Trimble, supra note 1, at 727-29. Professor Trimble observed:
The norm of a self-executing treaty has been approved twice by the
President (upon submission to the Senate and upon ratification) and by
at least two-thirds of the Senate. It has thus passed some formidable
political hurdles with all the potential attendant publicity and consen-
sus building entailed by the process .... If the subject matter of the
negotiation affects constituencies outside the State Department, such as
labor, trade, or agriculture, the concurrence of the relevant depart-
ments must be obtained.
In the process, political compromises can be made. The new rule is not
only in fact likely to have received explicit assent through a widely rec-
ognized law-making process, but it also carries whatever symbolism of
legitimacy follows its emergence from the political process.
Id. at 728-29 (footnotes omitted).
240. Id. at 729. It is argued that "[i]n the most extreme case, a rule could
evolve out of the practice of foreign nations while remaining entirely unknown
to all or most of the United States." Id.
241. Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV.
1555, 1556 & n.38 (1982).
242. See Colson, How Persistent Must the Persistent Objector Be? 61 WASH. L.
REV. 957, 969 (1986). The author discussed the situation in which a principle is
promoted as being universally applicable and is supported by a majority of
states. Id. at 965. A state which seeks not to be bound by the principle may
object; the level of objection, it is suggested, must be commensurate with the
intensity with which the practice is undertaken and claimed as binding. Id. at
967. The author states "where activity is intense, structured, clear, and vocal,
the persistent objector must continually make its position known to ensure that
the law does not find tacit consent through a relatively short period of silence."
Id.
243. Lillich, The Proper Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order,
11 VA. J. INT'L L. 9, 12 & n.17 (1970) (domestic courts "often 'must be relied
upon to perform the international function of upholding rights and duties
grounded in international law' ") (quoting L. ERADES & W. GOULD, THE RELA-
TION BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MUNICIPAL LAW IN THE NETHERLANDS
AND IN THE UNITED STATES 22 (1961)); cf Trimble, supra note 1, at 672 (courts'
"application of customary international law in a manner independent of the
political branches can only stifle appropriate developments of the law").
244. See H. STEINER & D. VACTS, supra note 10, at 360. These authors point
out that treaties have not been effective in the protection of human rights and
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apply the existence of a norm, a court should view its role as critical in
the development and enforcement of international law.2 4 5 Customary
law governs the conduct of states in the absence of controlling treaty
law. 24 6 According to Professor Fisher, "one of the best ways to increase
initial respect by a government for the rules of international law is to
weave those substantive rules into domestic law;" domestic courts, he
argued, are in a unique position to evaluate and enforce international
obligations.247
A court asked to apply a customary norm is faced with the difficult
task of determining its existence. 2 48 However, because customary law is
part of the law of the United States,2 49 "it need not be pleaded and
proved as are issues of ordinary fact."' 250 Accordingly, the court and
counsel who seek evidence of a customary norm:
[M]ust follow some rather standard patterns of going through
digests, opinions of text writers, law review articles, and docu-
alien-owned property, nor in the area of conflicting efforts of states to prescribe
economic regulation. Id.
245. See Lillich, supra note 243, at 11. This author states: "Moreover, far
too few commentators, much less judges, correctly perceive the domestic court
as 'an agent of an emerging international system of order, an agent that accords
precedence to the norms of international law when these norms come into con-
flict with the dictates of national policy.' " Id. (quoting Falk, Interplay of Westphalis
and Charter Conceptions of International Legal Order, in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LEGAL ORDER 32, 69 (R. Falk & C. Black eds. 1969)).
246. A. CASSESE, supra note 82, at 185. One may envision that multina-
tional treaty law may eventually be developed to "codify" all customary law that
arises through widespread state practice. However, Professor Cassese sug-
gested that "[s]tates cannot afford to leave major points of agreement in the
form of treaty regulations with the consequence that any State would be free to
evade the treaty regulation merely by withholding ratification." Id. In fact, he
pointed out that states have demonstrated an increasing tendency to enter into
multilateral treaties for the dual purpose of undertaking specific obligations of
the treaty as well as for clarifying general commitments which are binding on all
states as customary international law. Id. at 183.
247. See R. FISHER, IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW, 212-
35 (1981). The author stated that domestic courts are institutions that are gen-
erally respected. Id. at 212. Domestic courts may provide a forum for a plaintiff
who was denied access to relief in his own country. Id. at 214. He further as-
serted that "if international law is to be treated as law affecting the legal rights
and duties of people, it should be subjected to judicial scrutiny as are other
laws." Id. at 228.
248. See A. CASSESE, supra note 82, at 181 ("it nowadays proves exceedingly
difficult to ascertain whether a new rule has emerged, for it is not always possible
to get hold of the huge body of evidence required," to evidence a norm created
by a large number of diverse states).
249. For a discussion of The Paquete Habana as establishing customary law as
United States law, see supra notes 22-31 and accompanying text.
250. See Proceedings: Conference On International Human Rights in State and Fed-
eral Courts, 17 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 37 (1982). It is further stated that "[p]roving
international law as law is, of course, a legal process based upon documentation
and the arguments of counsel." Id. (emphasis added).
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COMMENT
mentary evidence of state practice. Researchers must also re-
view judicial opinions and weigh any conflicting practice to
determine whether or not a customary rule of international law
exists. Many international law and foreign law research tools
are now readily accessible, although they lack the comprehen-
siveness and relative certainty of domestic law research
tools. 2
5 I
Through the constitutional and doctrinal limitations imposed upon the
ability of domestic courts to decide matters of international law,2 52 it is
submitted that customary norms that will properly come before a court
will be those for which abundant evidence exists. 2 53
Domestic courts have been asked, however, to decide controversial
issues of international law. As a notable example, courts have applied
the process of interest balancing in determining the extraterritorial
reach of United States law. 254 Widespread commentary urges that pre-
scriptive jurisdictional conflicts can only be effectively resolved through
international agreements rather than through domestic judicial determi-
nations.2 55 Where a governing international agreement is not present, a
domestic court asked to decide a jurisdictional conflict may best serve
the development of international consensus by deciding the issue ac-
cording to the customary norm of reasonableness rather than by avoid-
251. Id.
252. For a discussion of the constitutional and doctrinal limitations upon a
court's ability to decide international matters, see supra notes 33-61 and accom-
panying text.
253. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428. The Supreme Court in Sabbatino sug-
gested that domestic courts may most appropriately consider areas of interna-
tional law when there exists substantial codification and consensus:
It should be apparent that the greater degree of codification or consen-
sus concerning a particular area of international law, the more appro-
priate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it, since the
courts can then focus on the application of an agreed principle ... not
inconsistent with the national interest or with international justice.
Id. For a further discussion of Sabbatino, see supra notes 45-51 and accompany-
ing text.
254. For a discussion of extraterritoriality and jurisdiction to prescribe, see
supra notes 195-98 and accompanying text. For a discussion of courts' consider-
ation of extraterritoriality in antitrust regulation, see supra notes 200-24 and ac-
companying text.
255. See, e.g., Maier, supra note 232, at 594-97. Professor Maier stated:
What appears to be a developing trend in the executive branch to at-
tempt to resolve issues of this kind in advance by means of international
agreement or at least on the basis of a prior communication is far pref-
erable to leaving the interest balancing that is essential to any generally
acceptable solution to the judicial forum. Continuing work on interna-
tional agreements to address these issues is of considerable utility. One
important effect will be the relieving of United States courts from a task
that they are ill-equipped to carry out and that they have not, in most
instances, effectively undertaken.
Id. at 597.
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ing the issue or applying a domestic standard. 2 56 United States courts
may provide an unbiased forum for determining and enforcing interna-
tional law. The domestic process of entering into treaty agreements
necessarily is subject to domestic political concerns. United States
courts, in contrast, may function independently and ascertain norms
with a view to a truly internationalist perspective. 25 7
In sum, the cases examined in the areas of human rights, expropria-
tion and extraterritoriality demonstrate that domestic courts have been
inconsistent in determining and applying international customary
norms. While United States treaty law is made through a domestic polit-
ical process and provides a more certain basis for judicial decisions, cus-
tomary law is the law of the United States in the absence of a controlling
treaty or statute. Courts are equipped to ascertain the existence of an
international custom and should apply controlling norms in an appro-
priate case. By so doing, courts will contribute to the development and
enforcement of international law.
M. Erin Kelly
256. See RESTATEMENT (No. 7), supra note 143, § 403(1)(a) (state may not
exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law when the exercise of such jurisdiction is
unreasonable; see also Zagaris & Rosenthal, United States Jurisdictional Considerations
in International Criminal Law, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 303, 355 (1985) (to harmonize
jurisdictional conflicts "judicial decisions must expressly consider the needs of
the international system").
257. See Kline, An Examination of the Competence of National Courts to Prescribe
and Apply International Law: The Sabbatino Case Revisited, 1 U.S.F. L. REV. 49, 81-
85 (1966) (courts may act to clarify long range interests of international commu-
nity and act as "the most dispassionate of all possible decision-makers"). Courts
are asked to defer to Executive Branch suggestions as to the outcome of a partic-
ular case which results in a practical limit ofjudicial independence. For a discus-
sion of executive suggestions, see supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text. See
also R. FALK, supra note 53, at 12. Professor Falk observed:
[I]t is contended that the operation of courts should be governed by
the structural characteristics of international society rather than by
transient foreign policy considerations. Such an orientation requires a
very determined and explicit commitment to judicial independence.
This is not a facile attainment in a world burdened with intense ideo-
logical conflict and distrust, but neither is it easy to envision a perma-
nent nuclear peace maintained by anything short of a gradual
substitution of global loyalties for national loyalties. It seems, at least,
that we could trust our own courts to apply international law.
Id.; cf Cardoza,Judicial Deference to State Department Suggestions: Recognition of Pero-
gative or Abdication to Usuiper? 48 CORNELL L.Q. 461, 498 (1963) (concluding that
"executive suggestions reveal the political facts on which the legal conclusions
have been based in the courts of the nation").
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